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WRITER'S PREFACE.
The purpose of this thesis is the determination of
the intention of the British Legislatureand the legis-
latures of other soverign%tiesasit is manifested in the
enactment of Lord Campbell's Act and of those statutes
for which it is the architype. The materials from 4
which the pervading purpose is to be deduced are inten-
ded to be confined in their character to those which are
the proper elements, of interpretation.
An unfortunate method of treatment has resulted
in the expansion of the subject to a tedious and weari-
some degree. I have used for it's discussion an inter-
constant
play of reasoning and a* adversity of argument blended
with a comparitive analysis of pertinent authority. By)k
thW f11Ete means I have given the affirmative or "contra"
argument in the eittracts from decisions which embody it,
that I may answer them by the counter tenets of opposing
cases or by such a logic as presents itself to my under
standings
If my criticisms of the theories of judges or the
reasons of their opinions be free and impertinent I o4'
-fer the apology of inability and plead the *infancy of
inexperience.
Willifm Allan DeFordq
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THE COMMON LAT!. REMARKS UPON ITS NATUF ,  AID CONSTITU4
TION.
A principle of the common law is the product develo
-ped from the judicial precedents which define the rights
of individuals in a specific situation of fact. This sit-
uation of fact is not the measure of the principle but
the discovery of the principle byi its application. It
may apply equally to a different state of facts embodying
rights of a like nature.An application of the principle to
a new arraingnent of facts is not the development of a
new principle but merely an adaptation of t!ie old,for by
the theory of the common law it is assumed that from 'i
time inmemmorial it has constituted a part of the common
law of the land and that it has not been applied before
because no occasion has arisen for its application.
A principle may apply to a situation of fact and en-
force the rights and redress the wrongs that exist by
virtue of itpr on the other hand the principle may be one
that rejects the conditions as not containing within
themselves rights which the policy of a certain period
will suffer them to enforce. Such is the peculiar consti
-tution of the common law,a constitution which confines
the redress of its tribunals within the limits of its or-
dained and established principles and which forbids the
4.
construction of newor the abrogatir n of old principles
for the creation of' new rights. The judges of the com-
mon law were not empowered to adapt the system to the
satisfact ion of the necessities of new conditions. They
were bound by the authority of rigid precedent which in i
instances became disastrous dogma. Their ability to ai-
leviate evils which resulted from the application of old
principles to new conditions was confined to the remedies
of the system,to the application of the principles which
were its component parts and in harmony with which they
must have constructed their decisions. The creation of
laws by whatever authority is nothing else than legisla-
tion. Legislation is the function,not of the judiciary,h
who are but the interpreters and appliers of existing la,
but of the supreme law making power which is itself the
sole judge of the wisdom and policy of its enactment. and
th~e adaptation of that enactment to the satisfaction of
the public needs and the fulfillment of a public duty.
When therefore the application of the iron rules of the
system to new conditions results so largely in evil that
that the law makers may deem it to effect materially the
public good they are generally prompted to its protection
by legislation.
REMEDIAL LEDISLATION ITS NATURE AND SCOPE.
3.That legislation,in a large sense,mist be deemed t'b.
be remedial of existing evil but with reference to the
causes of that evil;that isto tha rules of the common 'a
law which produce that evil as the result of their aPPli -
cation,they may be remedial or creative. They are in
this sense remedial when they cure a defect inherent in
the system,a defect that operates tb produce the evil.
This defect may be the application of a rule vhich causes
the evil by reason of its being unsuited to a situation
or conditions not contemplated when it was established.
This enactment is creative when it is directed to the
establishment of a principle,the lack of which in the
sv.stem,has caused the evil by its jurisdictional ignoring
of a right for which new conditions demand a recognition.
To recapitulate,it is remedial when it cures an im-
herent,positive defect,-when it seeks to amend a princi-
ple that so operates as to result in evilo .It is crea-_
tive w7hen it cures a defect that exists by reason of
there being a lack cf the principle which would,if it 'wee
applied,create the actionable right demanded,-creative
when it adds a new law to an imperfect science,a new part
to a defective organism.
LORD CAIPBELL'S ACT .: ITS TEXT.
It is with a single instance of the exercise of this
sovereign function of legislature that we have to do,an
6.
Act known to English jurisprudence as"Lord Campbell's
Act". It is with the relation of' this act to the perti-
nent common lai, thdl it's nature as an enactment that this
argument is interested,so that a knowledge of it's text at
this time is essential to an intelligent progress. The
Act is entitled "An Act for the Purpose of Compensating
the Familiea of Persons Killed in Accidents". Its pro-
visions are as follows,-
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That :re may gather the full import of' this legislatio,
that we may know it's nature and in that knowledge deter r
mine it's just and reasonable contruction,it is essentil
that we have a knowledge of the influenccs which impelled
it's enactipent.Tt1e problem for solution is as to-whether
it was intended to create a right absolutely independEnt
in itself of any previously ex~isting legal relations or
actionable rights,or whether from it's situation in the
entire English Jurisprudence it can reasonably be satid,
in obedience to the proper elements of construction,
that the right of action created was intended to be dep-
endant upon or a continuation of a pre-exsisting legal r
right.
r: THE VALUE OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THIE ,ILLATIOIT ,1
F A-REMREDIAL STATUTE TO THEE VIL SOUGHT TO BE CURED.
An elementary basis for the construction of a rem-
edial statute is the determination of the evil which it
was directed to cure. the nature of the one determines
the nature of the other. A knowledr-e of the c(nstitution
of the one leads us to an understanding of the other- when
thereforefrom an analysis of the pertinent elements
of jurisprudence,we have decided that the statute may
have been directed to the elimination of one,or perhaps
of two evils,the remedy applied to their cure will eithei-..
establish or destroy or premisefor if one,or both,fit
exactly in the notches of mutual relation there is a
"C0uod erat demonstrandum".,oiv,if contrathey fail,(,r
either fails to sustain a logical relation to the remedy,
in an argumentative adjustment,then it must be concluded
that they,or one of the two,w'as not the cause of the leg-
islation.
The nature of the statute itself directsjur study
in that it grants a right of action based upon the wi'ong-
ful destruction of a lifc.which is in fact it's subject
matter and for that reason guides us to the conside:'ation
of the status of human life,or more properly it's destruct
-ion,it: lawr.
HISTORICAL DEVELOP -ErT OF THE EVILS EX$ISTINT IN TIM, SYS)
TEM OF THE CO'71ON L-AfW.
In the remote ages,the end of government was the con-
duct of war and inter-tribal negotiation coupled with the
right of certain exactions from the governed for the mairi
-tainance of the political structure. Government,in shorV
was the government of a people'in their relation to other
peoples. In the progress of time,submitting to the in-
fluences of an increasing civilization,it's scope became
extended to an arraingment of the status of the govern-
ed and to the protection of the individual rights!-fixed
by that status. This arraingment came to be called
jurisprudence. As these systems of jurisprudence devel-
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oped they agreed in drawing a distinction between offen-
ses against the state or community and offenses against
the individual. nTatural and simple as may seem this sep
eration/it was,never-the-less,a growth. The law of
ancient cormiunities wras not the law of crimes,it was the
law of wrongs. In the early days of social organization
the sole penalty for crime inflicted by authority of the
state was a payment of compensation in damages or by way
of penalty. All offenses alike gave rise to an oblig,-*i-
tion or "vinculum juris" and were all requited by the pay-
meit of money.
A complex system of money compensations were alike
the characteristics of the law of the early Germanic and
Anglo Saxon peoples. These compensations were grada-
tions of life values proportioned to the rank of the sev-
eral classes in the community or state. As for every
man from carldorman to serf there was aixed estimate
of value) so for every injury inflicted there was a rated
compensation dependant upon the nature of that injury,the
sum varying according to the adventitious circumstances.
In time the ruling power(of a nature too feeble to
be called government)came to demand of the homicide or his
kin a certain penalty for the infringaent of it's peace.
This ',as a decided though insignificant advance by gov,-1
eminent toward the final assertion of the right to punish
a wrong done the individual as an offense against the
I0.
state. The "bot",the fixed rate of compensation for a
given life,was to be paid the family of the deceased for
the injury they had suffered from his death. The penalty
or"wehr",for the infrinqent of the kings peacewas paid
to the officers of the crown.
In addition to this satisfaction of wrongs by the a
payment of money,this early law permitted the relatives
of the deceased to revenge themselves upon the wrongdoer -
and his kindred ) and by the infliction of this summary
justice escape the slower and more regular process of the
coubts;and when resort ias had to the courts the measure
of ve~ng ance likely to be exacted was a guide in the es-
timation of damage. I -'_
In the advance of time these crude methods of punish-
ment,from practical considerations of their in-efficiency
for the restraint of crime,were superseded by punishr~ents
inflicted by the state. Accompanying the arrogation of
this power by government was a correlative extinction of
punishment by money compensations at law. To the judges
of a latXer period/the idea of personal ve~ngance as a -
driterion of damage,the idea that one individual should hv
have a personal and pecuniary interest in the life of
another seemed barbarous and for that reason became abhor-
rent. A probable reason for their antipathy to such com-
pensation+ as the constant prostitution in a court of jus-
II.
ticeof natural sentiment to to substantial gain.
These evils resultant from the compensations system were
the influences that effected the establishment of the rule
of the common law that "IN A CIVIL COURT TIE DEATH OF A
HtUMAN BEING COULD NOT BE 101PLAIhED OF AS AN INJURY".
Baker vs. Boltbn I Camp. 493.
Hutchins vs. Butcher,I Brown& G.26
This rule was established by the mere judicial fiat of
Lord Ellenberough and was unaccompanied by an exposition
of the "rationes decendendi". However precarious and
frail may have been its basis in reasbn/it was universal-
ly accepted as an authotitative precedent and became a
fixed principle of the con on law. We have established
then,as a basis for arg-ument, the principle that ti e wrong
-ful destruction of a human life was not cognizable at
law,as a civil wrong.
Looking again to the common law we find that an in-
dividuals right of action for personal injuries perished
with his life in obedience to the ancient maxim of the
commo n law that "Actio personalis moritur cam. persona".
If Lord Campbell's Act hadthen,relationito any of
the pre-exsisting principles or conditions of the common
law,it mustand is conceded to have referred to the firsts
named condition or the principle embodied in the maxim
"Actie personalis".
Accepting these established doctines or principles
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as the defects ex~isting in the system of the cormenh.
law~and proceeding in a quasi inductive methodit will be
our purpose to discovr the remedies which would have
been the natural and reasonable means of ler islative cure.
An effective presentation demands a primary inquiry
into the nature of the maxim "Actio personalis" as fairly
determinative of it's applicable remedy. The effect of
the maxic "Actio personalis"was that a person's right of
action for a wrongful injury done him was destroyed by the
resulting death. That we may appreciate the evils flow-
ing from the rule it is essential that we know the qua!-',
ities of the right destroyed by the rule. The action .uaiTQ,
able b:, the injured party in his life-timeaccrued at the
time of the injur.and -as based upon the loss resulting
from the injured person's inability to attend to his usual
trade or vocationupon the surgical.-or medical expenses
incurred in the treatment of the injury and the physical
.0
suffering of the person injured. If it was the deatruct*'p
rf this right which was to be subjected to remedial legis-
lation what would have been the ef 'ective cure? It would
have been simp! y a statute providing brie*ftt\rights
of action for personal injuries shall not be extinguished
by the death of the person injured but shal! survive for
the benefit of the deceased's estate. Such an enact-
ment would have effected a complete abrogation of the ol
13.
fensive rule and such survival statutes have been dir-
ected to that end in a large nunber of the Federal States.
If contra the evil which the Legislature intended
to er~adicatepas,as comphrehended in the first premise,
the lack of a principle which would- L)er-mit a recovery
based upon wrongful death,whlat would have been the aC-
equate proceldure by enactment? It would haveAexactly
Lord Campbell's Act as' enacted by the British Parliament
in the year I846,during the 9th and I0th Victorian Ses--i .
sions.The debate in the house of commons conclusively dem-
o sr
onst,tes this to have been it's intended nature and I
think that I may affirmlthat in all the discussion that
prece~ded it's passage there was no word or sentence :Ih u
which indicated the act to have been directed to any
other purpose than the establishment of the principle
which,I have said,was sought to be incorporated in the
law. There is no where a reference to the abrogation of
the rule "Actio personalis" with the exception of the un-
noticed suggestion of the Honorable Speaker that they
could,in a large degree,eliminate the evil by a continua-
tion or survival of the right -f action destroyed by the
operation of the maxim. 3tThe whole trend of the argument
presented in support of the bill,Lord Campbell's exhaust-
ive explanation of the effect intended,in it's critical
review by the Lord Advocate and Attorney Generql for the
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Crown,it every-where appears that the evil sought to be
remedied was the lack of a principle which woul grant to
a bereaved family or kinja recovery for the wrongful des-
truction of a life upon which they were dependEnt for sup-
port or subsistenceor from the continued ex~istence of
rhich they could reasonably expect pecuniary profit. The
effort of evry speaker,except the few in criticism,was
directed to the exposition of this evil and to the cdemand
that the remedy formulated by Lord Campbell be enacted.
In accepting thee as proofs of intention in debate we
may substantiate or destroy the conclusion that such was
the intention by an analysis of the enactment.
AN ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION OF TIlE STATUTE "IN IPSE".
In dessecting this statute it will be our purpose
to see if there is in it any where the slightest reference
to any purpose other thaft the one which we maintain was
intended to permEate it;whether in the whole text of the
act there is anything which is inconsistontjwith atninten-
tionjo establish an absolute and independant principle, t
that the destruction of a human life shall be a civil
wrong. In so doing it is inevitable that we enter into a
comparative application of it's provisions to the princi-
ple mentioned and the maxim "Actio personalis".
The act is entitled"An Act for the Compensating of
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Families of Persons Killed in Accidents".
The title in itself contains n(- reference to any
right that has arisen anterior to the death. It premises
death as the subject of 'iction vjhich is to compensate the
families of personkilled in accidents. It does not read
"An Act to Continue to the Personal Representative& of a
Deceased Person his Rights of Action for Personal Injuri~s,
or "AN At'ct to abrogate the Maxim Actio Personalis &c.&c.
It refers simply to the giving of compensation for the
reasons and under the conditions to be set forth in the b
.,body of the statute.
The exposition of the reason and purpose of the act
is developed as follows in the Preamble. "Whereas NO s "-4
AMTION AT LA7S IS NOW MAINTAINABLE AGAINST A PERSON WFHO
BY HIS WRONGFUL ACTEGLECT OR DEFAULT MAY HAVE CAUSED
THE DEATH OF ANOTHER PERSON) and it is oftimes right and
expedient that the wrong-doer,in such a case,should be an-
swerable in damages for the injury so caused by him,be
it &c".
That part of this preamble which reads "Where-as no
action at law is now maintainable against a person who by
his wrongful act,neglect or default may have caused the
death of another person"is significant and as plainly
and clearly as language can express tihought,expr'ses the
evilthe defect in the system of the common law which the
16.
statute it introduces is intended to cure. Yet learned
Judges have attributed in effect to this simple expre.;-ir
sion an entirely diverse meaning. They have said that,in
those words,the Legislature intended to say that "WThereas
by virtue of the common law rule "Actio personalis" the vi
rights of action which vest in persons who have received
by reason of the wrongful act,neglect or default of ano-ca
another certain personal injuries,are extinguished by
their death,and it is oftimes right and expedient that
the wrong-doer should be answerable for the injuries so
caused by him ,there-fore be it &c."
For this construction they have no authority in law
or basis in reason and it can only be explained in the
theoryhat they attribute to the legislature not the lan-
guage or meaning they intendedbut a language or meaning
THEY SHOULD HAVE USED AS BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE b
JUDICIALTIDEA OF EXACT JUSTICE. The language is simple and
plain and states explicitly and clearly the reason of the
legislation. No Ju iciary can rightfully over-ride it
with a secrnnd or alternative meaning or an inferred latent
intent.
The enacting clause of the statute proceeds as fol-
lows,- Be it there-fore enacted by the Queens most exce>+
lent "Tajesty &C----that whensoever the death of a person
shall be caused by wrongful act,neglect or default and ;i
17.
the act neglect or default be suc4as would(if death had
not ensued)have entitled the injured party to maintain
an action and recover damages in respect there-ofthen and
in every such case,the pearson who would have been liable
if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for
damages not-with-standing the death of the person injured
and although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to u felony"
The words" whensoever death shall be caused" demoi--
s irate the intent and nature of the enactmentand fix it's
subject-matter.
The clause"The actneglect or default is such as
would(if deth had not ensued)have entitled the injured
party to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
there-of"denotes the origin and quality of the actioMa-
bility upon which the action that is to be created Shall
depend for it's maintainance in a court of law.
The clause "notwith-standing the death of the person
injured" is purposed to continue this action-a-bility in
crder that it may survive a death which,under the rule r
"Actio personalis"would have been destroyed. It is like-
wise intended by this clause to withstand the effect of
the principlthat "the death of a human being could not
be complained of as an injury in a court of law".
kThe words"and altough death shall have bee)3 caused
18.
under such circumstances as amount in law to felony"v,,f,
-efer,and demonstrate the next preceding clause to hve
reforred,to the conditions of actiona-bility made the
test of the action under the statutebut which would have
been of no effect if the rules cf the corwnon lavw had been
suffered to operate. The clause clearly establishes the
proposition that the object of it's own insertion together
with the words"if death had not ensued" and "rlot-with-
standing death"were intended to avoid the effect of cer-A.
tain principles which would have destrcyed the action-a-
bility upon which the statulory right is made to depend
for it's maintainance.
The second section of the statute denominates the
beneficiaries of the action under the statute and prc.
scribes the personal representatives of the person de-
ceaseds trustees in respect of the right of action crea-
ted by the Act. The beneficiaries under the act ,the
widow and the next of kin,are of course,different and
distinct from the person receiving the primary injury
flowing from the wrongful act,neglect or default.The jui-y
in awarding the damage are by the express terms of this
section,limited to the award of such damage as they may
tink proportioned to the injury RESULTING FROMI THE DEATH,
to the parties respectively to whomn ahd for whose ben-
efit such action shall be brought. By this explicit
19.
definition of the nature of the damage to be awarded.the
elements of 'damage flowing from the wrongful act,neglect,
or default to the person injuredlare pre-cluded from es-
timation as a basis of recovery under the statute. by ex-
press direction the damages to which recovery under the
statute is limitedare for the injuries flowing,not for
the primal injuryIbut for the injury to d ben-
eficiarieswhich flows from'the fatal result of the primal
wrong to the individual,death.
The section continuing provides for the method of ap-
portionment of the damages recovered. Section third of
the statute is unimportant to the purpose of this theses.
I have postponed a detailed analysis of the context
of the statute for the reason that the exposition and ref-
utation of certain arguments,which I shall attempt to meet.
will present more clearly the propositions and principles
that are disputed in reasonand are universally opposed
to each other in judicial construction;for the further
reason that the arguments contra are there presented
with all the clearness and in all the strejw _th of which
they are capable.
I have endeavored by the somewhat superficial dis-
cussion of the parts of the statute and the functions of
it's various clauses,which I have just completed,to make
clear the fact that each part serves an apparent and
20.
necessary purpose,that each part was essential to the
consumH tion of the end suiz t to be attained,that each
sustains to the other a reasonable relation and that each
part is in perfect consistency with the several parts andA
with the whole;that through the whole body of the act ti'
there runs a clear,pervading intention plainly evidenced
by the expression employed.and and that however many alte,
-nate and latent meanings the words and sentences may be
capable of affording to the nerson seeking for a different
or additionalntention,that there appears upon the face
of the whole a simple,constant and logical purpose,which
is,to incorporate with-in the law of England the principle
that the wrongful destruction of a human life shall be a
civil wrong and to provide for it's redress a suitable
method of procedure.
Diverting our attention from the text of the act we
will,for a time,devote ourselIZo an exposition of the v>-"
various decisions in consltruction of the statute, ren-
dered by the co; rts in the jurisdiction of it's first ap-
plication.
ENGLISH CASES IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
OF THE STATUTE.
The first of the adjudicated cases having pertinence
to the question with which we are involved,is that of
BLAKE vs. THE MIDLAND RAILWAY CO. decided by the court of
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the Queen's Bench,Febuary 22nd.,I852,with Lord Campbell
C.J. presiding,the opinion delivered by Coleridge J. The
question directly presented for determination was as to
whether the mental suffering of the bereaved family could
be taken into the estimation of damages. In the solution
of this question the court collaterall: considered the ri'
nature of the act by the particular terms of which they
were to be controlled. Pertinent to this thests the Court
said:-
"It will be evident that this action does not transfer
the right of action to his representatives but gives to
his representatives a totally neN right of action on dif-
ferent principles."
This sentence is the more significant in that it was
approved by Lord Campbell and the rule made absolute.
In I868,in the Court of the Queen's Bench, a decis-
ion was made in the case of READ vs. THE GREAT EASTERN
RAILWAY CO. ,which is directly antagonistic to the theory
that the act was intended to incorporate a new yrinciple
with-i.n the English lawjand contends to the contrary that
it was directed to the obviation of the effect of the
maxim "Actio personalis" as vrill appear in the prevailing
and affirming opinions. The facts are in substance
these. The deceased Read was injured by the wrongful
neglect of the Company and died of the hurts received.
Before death he accepted a sum of money in full satis-
faction and discharge of all his claims and causes of
22.
action apginst thp d-f -d rts The action vas broug7ht
by the widow under Lord Campbell's Act for the inliury
resulting to her from the death. In adjudication Black-
burn,J. said:-
"Before the statute a person who had received
apersonal injury and survived it's consequences,could
bring an action and recovr damages for the injury;but il'r
he died from it's effects then no action could be brought
To meet this state of the law the 9 and 10 Victoria,
Chapter 9') was passed and "whenever the death of person
is caused by a wrongful act,and the wrongful actis such
as would(if death had not ensued) have entitled the iL-
jured person to maintain an action and recover damages.
in respect there-of,tben and in every such case,the person
ivho would have been liable if death had not ensued shall
be liable to an action for damages not-with-stLanding tnei
death of the party injured." Here taking the Plea to be
true the party injured could not maintain an action in
respect there-of because he has already received satis-
faction".
Lush,judge,affirming the opinion above quoted in pat
part says:-
"The intention of the statute is not to make the
wrongdoer pay twice for the same wrongful act,but to en-
riable the representatives of the pei'son injured to recover
in a case where the maxim "Actio personalis moritur curm
persona"would have applied.
It was there-fore held that the action--under the statute
could not be maintained. Of the "rationes decendendi"
I can speak but briefly here,for the reason that in each
succeeding case the same logic appears for analysis, and
I would there-fore be involved in a continuous repetition.
Blackburn,J., declares tha statute to have been dir-
ected to the obviation of the maxim "Actio personalis".
Of the soundness of that conclusion hereafter. He con-
ditions the right to maintain the action,not upon the ac-
ionable quality of the deceased's injur-but upon the
IJ
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status of the right arising by virtue of' it. 1Ie makes
the clause"which would(if death had not ensued)have enti-
tled the injured party to maintain an action"refer,not to
the actionable origin of' the wrong but to the condition
of that wrong as a right in law. What is the plain and
reasonable effect of the clause? Is it not to make the
iature of the wrongful act,neglect or default,in it's
relation to the injured and deceased party the test of the
right to main-tain the action under the statute? Does
it notini effect,say,that if the act was wrongful and the
deceased or injured party'did not contribute to the com-
mission of the wrong in a Way to relive the wrong-doer
of civil liability for the act,then,and in every such case
the relatives injured by the death,in which the personal
injury to the deceased results,shall have a right to rec-
over of the wrong-doer for the damage they have sustained.
Such appears to me to be the simple,reasonable and patent
meaning of the clause. As to the consideration of any
further meaning it may have had~see analysis of the op-
inion of Rapallo,J,in Littlewood vs. the Mayor, succeeding.
Lush,J., affirming,says,that"it was not te intention
to make the wrong-doer pay twice for the same wrongful a
act". It was not the intention to make the wrong-doer
pay at all for the wrongful act.The wronful act is the :
mere origin of the injury not the injury itself. It was
24.
the intention that he should be compelled,by the action
created,to pay for the injury that resulted from the -
wrongful act to the family or next of kin. That injury
is only a part of the entire injury flovring from the
\,' on. * The damage the deceased or his estate sustained
by virtue of the personal injury,is not an element of
damage under the statute. The injury that any one else
may have sustained is precluded. Flurt _er,when you pa:
for one evil result of an act are you "ipso facto" co: ;
pensating for the injury inflicted by another result.
Is it impossible that two sepaxate and distinct injuries
to separate and distinct personsriginate in one wrongful
act? The position is untenable.
The intention of the statute,he continues,"was to
enable tle representatives of the person injured to rec-
over in a case where the maxim "Actio personalis"would
have applied". By this it is meant that in a case where
the operation of the maxim"Actio personalis" had defeated
by it's operation the right of the person injured to rec-
over,then,and only upon such conditionshall the action c
created by the statute be maintainable :t law. In effect
he affirms that the principle incorporated in the law by
the statutc is only to have effect where the operation of
a different principle based upon a different species of
damage,hag been defeated by the operation of a maxim which
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the statute itself in no way purports tojffect. That I
think cannot be maintained in reason and in adherence to
the elementary principles of construction. His logic de-
rives it's nature from and originates in the fact that
the wrong which gives the actionable quality to the in-
jury maintainable at the coirnon law,is made to give the
same quality to the action created by the statute. See
Littlewood vs the Mayor ante.
Continuing Lush,J.,says,"It only points to a case
where the party injured has not recovered compensation
against the wrong-doer". By this he must mean that an
actionable right based upon an imjury which arises sub-
sequently to the primary injuryand whose elements of
damage are based upon the totally different interests of
persons other than those who could have been effected by
the injury to the person deceasedshall only be maintain-
ed when that different right of a different person based
upon damage to a different interest shall have been des-
troyed. The proposition refutes itself. In any event
it rests upon the naked fiat of a single judge and is in
it's very nature,a highly arbitrary rule.
The case of Read vs. the Gileat Eastern Railway Co.,
' ',i1e being an authority in law contrary to the theory
C
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which we favoradds little,if any strength to the logic
of the opposing argument and introduces for ti;e first
time that all pervading desire to conform law and legal
construction to certain ideas of right and justice per-
taining to the individual Judges.
The case of Pym vs. The Great Northern,decided in
I865,whiclh we next considershould h-,ave prece~ded chron-
ologically the case of Read vs. The Great Eastern,supra.
Erle j.,,in the solution of a collateral point,prejented
the following dicta in his opinion:-
"The statute,as it appears to me, gives this personal rep-
resentative a cause of action beyond that which the de-
ceased would have had if he kiad survived".
This annotation is given merely to preserve the connection
of authority.
Next succeeding Read vs. The Great Eastern and directly
antagonistic to it in spirit and principle appears the
decision and "rationes decendendi" in the case of Bradshaw
vs.The Lancashire & Yorkahire R.R. Co. In Read vs. Great
Read
Eastern &c.,to recapitulatehad entered into a settlement
and received a satisfaction for the personal injuries he
had sustained and the action was brought under the statute
by the widow for the injury resulting to her from his
death. In this case of Bradshaw vs. Lancashire &c.the
action was based upon the breach by the defendant company
in that they did not exercise due care in the carrying of
the party injured upon their train. The plaintiff as ex-
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ecutrix sought to recover for the damage his estate had
sustained in the payment of medical expense, and the losL
accri!ng to the estate by reason of his inability to at-
tend to busineas.
Before entering into a review of the opinion in this
case I desire to remark upon the nature of the action.
It was brought to recover the damage sustained by the es-
tate by reason of the breach -of contract to carry safely.
The breachviz.,the wrongful neglect,resulted in a person-
al injury to the deceased,the injury resulting in a loss
to the estate by reason of the payment for medical at-
tendance and his inability to attend to business. Acdks
0injury flowed fzom the same wrong. No recovery was
claimed for the physical suffering of the deceased as it
seemS to have been admitted that the right to recovery
for such suffering was personal in it's nature and that
for that reason it perished with the individual. It may
be said with some show of reason, that there is a 4=ncon-
sistency in fact with the case of Read vs.The Great East-
ern and it like-wise may be said that there is a perfect
,conksitency. Was not the right of the injured party to
a recovery for the personal injury based as much upon the
payment of medical expenses and inability to attend to
his business as upon his physical suffering? As a matter
of fact did not the maxim "A:ctio personalis, operate to
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destroy the right to recover upon any of the elements
of damage pertaining to the injured persons rightjfor the
reason that they arose from the same personal injury?
Admitting that there is no inconsistency of fact bet-
ween the cases of Read vs. The Great Eastern and Bradshaw
vs. Th Lancashire & Yorkshire(as contended in Littlewood
vs. The Mayor)does it necessarily follow that there must
be a like _consistency in the tenets of the opinionqin ti
the principles applied to the situation of fact. I think i
not. One situation of fact may be rightfully determined
in the result of the decision while the logical processes
of the determination may be entirely in the wrong;again,
a different situation of fact may call for a determination
or reasoning in principle lthat would apply with equal
force to diverse circumstalices and surroundings. On the
other hand two different situations of fact may call for
the consideration of the same essential principle 'Which,
by a wrong application came in the one case to a wrong ,
and in the other a right result.
Proceeding then to a comparison or analysis of the
principles deduced in the case of Bradshaw vs. The R.R.
Co. I submit this extract from the opinion of orove,judge.
"Does the fact that in this casebesides the injury
to the estate,the testator's death has like-wise result-
ed from the breach of contractmake any difference,or does
the fact that provision l-as been made in such a case for
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compensation in respect of' the death,take away any right
of action that the executrix would have had but for the
Act? It does not seem to me that the act has that effect
either uxpressly or by necessary implication". (See writers
note*.) "The intention of the Act was to give the person-
al representatives the right to recover compensation as a
trustee for children or other relatives left in a vczeI
pecuniary condition by reas(n of the injured person,S
death,not to effect any expisting right belonging to the
personal. estate in general." "There is no reason why the
statute should interfere with any right of action an ex-
ecutor would have had at the common law." "In thecaso of
such a right of action he sues a legal owner of the gen-
eral personal estatejhich has descended to him in course
of law,-under tlhe Act he sues as trustee in respect of
a different right altogether on behalf of particular
persons designated in the Act."
This quotation,I think-,expressly negatives the prop-
osition that Lord Cwanpbell's Act was intended to create
an actionwhic , could only be maintained when recovery
of damageustained by the deceased in his life time could
-ot be obtainelby reason of the rule"Actio personalis'.IIt
does -t least sr far as the elements of medical expenses&c
t. 07-. C C Y r, L
*a -e as alba' t..o losr t t... estate of the injured
sfteer8 also tho to th estabe h injurd
party by reason of his inability to attend tohis cu-stomary
trade or vocation. A reference to these elernents,which. ---
fo . the freater part composed the right of action which
vested in the person injured ,satisfy the principle that
the ACTION WAS INTENDED TO GIVE OR ESTABLISI ,'OT TO A71
* Note.-If it was the intention as maintained in Read vs.
Great East. &c.and Littlewood vs. mayor that the act
should only grant recovery when the perscn ii.jured had
not obtained releif and did not mean a recovey upon
both rights,how are they reconciled with the cases in
hand?These hold that the act is Prosective and c4.ea' ive.'
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RIDGE,ABROGATE OR FIX DEPENDANCY UPON A PAST CONDITION OR
TIE STATUS OF A PRE-EX ISTTNG RIGHT. IT WAS NOT ITTENDED
TO BE RETPOACTIVE IN IT'S EFFECT UPON RIGHTTS ALREADY
GIVEN OR TO ABROGATE PRIT',CIPLES ALREADY ESTAPLISJED BUT
TO' INCORPORATE A NE PRINCIPLE AND PROVIDE A METHOD I-"
IAVI FOR IT'S RECOCMITION,TO DETERMINE IT'S QUALITY AND
M',EASURE TiE EXTENT OF IT'S LIMIT.
The succeeding and the 1 ast of the English cases
pertinent to this theses,is the case of Leggott vs. The
Great Northern Rail-road Co.which interprets the decision
and submits to the authority of Bradshaw vs. Lancashive&C.
which proceeded it by one year. The decision in review
was rendered in 1876. The action was broughtby the widow,
as the administratrix of the estate of her deceased hus-va
band,who had been injured by the neglect of the defendant
Company and who died from the effects of the injuries
receivedto recover the damage sustained by his estate in
the payment of medical and other expenses incident to
the treatment of his injuriesland for the loss occas~ion-
edo his business. It was admitted that she had brought,
as administratrix,and recovered judgment in a previous
action under the statute ,and it was contended by the def-
ense that such a recovery was a bar to any causes of act-
ion originating in the same wrongful act. Inquiring
into uhe nature of the action granted by the statute and
compa-ing it with the action brought upon the common law
rightMellor,J.,says:-
"It seems that though nomina ly the mach-
inery of tha action in the one case is the same as the
machinery of the action in the otheryet the action(stat-
utory)in which the verdicL has been rendered was an action
of a very special and limited description. It was an
action given expressly by the statute and must be con-
fined within the limits of the statute. It was to provide
for whau the law had not before provided for,namely,the
right of an administrator or executor to a-Le for the
benefit of the fainilyin respect of the death of the de-
ceased,occas)ioned by the negligence of other persons.****
**** It is o be observed that the executrix in a case
under the act,does not sue in respect of anything that
belonged to the deceased,but by force of Lhe statute which
enacts that the deceased's death is to be made the subject
of an action just as if he had lived".
Quain,J.,affirming,says:-
"Lord Campbell's Act enables an
action to be brc-rght in a casr where it could not have
been brought be.Lore that actf' , ******* Now Lord Camp-
bell's Act gives an entirely new right of action and not
connected with the estate of the deceased in the slightest
d ogree,anC the damages recoverable in it would be no part
of the (,state of the deceased."
The parts of the opinions that I have offered are in
direct oppositiofo the "rationes decendendi" of Read vs.
The Great East.. They thouroughly demonstrate the enact-
menL to have been aimed at the incorporation of a new,
not the abrogation or obviation of an old principle;they
affirm the absolute independency of the right created and
expose clearly the nature of the enactment and the
quality of it's effect.
It is said, in Littlewood vs. The Mayor ,ante,that
in the Leggott case" the soun('ness of the decision in the
Bradshaw case was doubted but that it was yielded to as
The principles or logic,pertinent to thisan authority.
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argument,established in the Bradshaw case are expressly
affirmed and are m6re clearly exposed in the case we have
in hand. It is true that Mellor,J. said,that "With a
single exception,as far as I am aware, of the case in the
common pleas(Bradshaw vs. Lancashire), there appears to be
no authority that an action will lie by an executor or
administrator in respect of what is claimed in this
action. . But as the case has been decided,I yield en-
tirely to the authority of the decision,so far as to
say,,-hat in this court it cannot be questioned and we must
there-fore abide by it". (Above has been quoted.)
These words have no reference to the parts of the
opinion in the Bradshaw case rofering to the nature of
Lord Ch:mpbell's Act or it's relation to antecedent rights,
but doubts the authority and reason of permitting damage
to the personal estate,which flowed from the personal in-
jury ca-sing death,to be the subject of an action brought
by the executor and intimates that it should have been
deemed as much subject to the rule actio personalis as the
element of physical suffering. Instead of proving an in-
consistency or questioning of the principles thei-e-in en-
unciated it has the reverse effect. It says plainly that
while the mere giving of the new action by Lord Campbell's
Act is not to be construed as effecting any-prev ious ri
right,we are in doubt as to whether the action which the
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executrix brings should have escaped the maxim "Acti+per-
sonalis". The question in direct consideration was one of
estoppel and it was expre)kssly held that there was no
estoppel in as much as"the actions are not brought in
the same right.
Barnett vs. Luca,the report of which is not ac-
cessable to the writer of this theses,decides the same
point in affirmation of the same principles,decided in
the Leggott case. A review of the &pinion in this case,
containing an identical matterwould be surplusage.
Haiing,in this somewhat limited sense,reviewed the
opinions in construction of the statute in the country of
it's origin,I have deemed it essential to the purpose of
this thes~s,to enter into a somewhat prolonged discussion
of the cases,involving the same problem and like prin-
cipleswhich have presented themselves for adjudication
to the Tew York Court of Appeals and several of the infer-
iol trbttnals of that state. These cases present substan-
tially the various arguments upon the proposition pro and
con. For that reason, having neither the space nor the
disposition,I shall be content with their exposition,in
the considerationIthat the numerous cases i*-point,decided
in the jurisdictions of other states,while determining ca
o-r proposition either for or against advance in either
direction the"rationes decendendi" which are clearly dev-
eloped in the English and ITew York cases and which vary
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ElXPOSITION AND DTSCUSSION OF PERTIi]ENT 17"T, 1 YORK
CASES.
The earliest case demanding a construction of the
ITew york statute,which is substantially the English Act,t
is thzlt of ;ibble vs: The New York & Erie R. R. Cool
The action was brought by the personal representatives
under the statute to recover damage for a wrongful death.
An accord and satisfaction with the injured party was of-
fered in bar by the defendant company. The fact was not
disputed.' The Court,by Johnson,J.,said:-
"The right of action
is made to depend not only upon tle character of the act
from which death ensue1but upon the condition of his claim
at the time of death also :. *****"TThe object of the stat-
ute was to continue the cause of action which the injured
party ha4and which he had not enforced~but might have en-
forced if death had not ensued,for the benefit of the
widow and next of kin to enable them to obtain damages
resulting from the same primary causeknd not to create an
entirely new and additional , right of action'. The plain-
tiff's construction would give two actions for a single
wrongful act and frequently a double compensation for the
injury flowing from it to the same individuals".
The refutation of the proposition that the statute
made the action it created depend upon the status of the
claim arising from the wrongful act as well as upon the
actionability of the wrong itself,I leave to the analysisi
in Littlewood vs. The 1,ayor. The proposition ;hat the
object of the statute was simply to conzinue the cause of
action which the person injured had and not to give a new
and additional right ",ill not bear scrutiny. An act pro-
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viding for the sux-vival of rights of actionor personal
injuries would have accomplished the desired end and have
completely obviated the operation of the maxim "Acti., p
personalis". Can it be said,with reason,that LordCam "
bell's Act,an act providingfor the"compensation of famili-
es of persons killed in accidents" was the legislative
method of effecting the abrogation of the simple rule that
personal actions die with the person? Can ilb e said that
an action making the fatal resultof an injury a civil
wrong actionable for the benefit of different persons,
was merely a means of providing for the survival of the
right of action which vested in the party injured? If the
theory was the fact,the Legislature,for the cure of a sim-
ple defect,have staggered blindly and circuitously to a
goawhich they have not reached,if the universal construct
-ion of the act is to be accepted.
The Judge saysthat"the plaintiff's construction
would give two rights of action for a single wrongful act
and frequently a double compensation for the injury flow-
ing from it to the same individuals". Rights of action
are never given for a wrongful act. They are given for
the injuries that flow there-from. The wrongful nature
of the act is the test of the actionability of the injury
w ich gives that injury the legal right to redress.
Continuing,he says, "that it would give frequently a
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double compensation for the injury flowing from the act
to the same individuals." That could not be so. The i
injury to the deceased,if compensated forwould bar the
rights accruing by virtue of that injury. It is an ab-
surdity to maintain that he could recover for his own
death or that a recovery for the injury flowing from his
death is in fact a recovery for the persoknal injury pri-
marily flowing from the wrong. To conclude,the injury
7hlich is the subject matter of the statutory action flows
to and accrues for the benefit of the wife,children or
kin;the primary injury to the person of the individual
flows to and accrues for his sole benefit,so that it is
obvious that there are DIIFERENT AND DISTINCT INJURIESTO
DIFFERENT AND DISTINCT PERSONSIYIICH ARE TO BE DISCHARGED
BY A SEPERATE AND DIFFERING SATISFACTION.
The decision in this case was appealed from and the
argument in the Court Of Appeals resulted in an equal
division for and against it's affirmance. A reargument
was ordered but the appeal aeems never to have been fin-
ally determined. The re-argument was heard during the
term with which the Court was engaged with the case of
Whitford vs. The Panama R.R. Co. which we shall next con-
side -and in which,the same principles substantially
being in controversythe courtby a division of five to
oneover-ruled in effect the decision of the general term
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in the Dibble case. In the Whitford case Denio,J., writ-
ing t'he opinion said:-
"It is not a simple Xevolution of a
cause of actionwhich the deceased would have had that the
statute effects,but it is an EAITIRELY ITEW CAUSE OF ACTION
WhICH IS SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED. The statute does not pro.
fess to revive his cause of action in favor of the exec-
utor or acdninistrator. The compensation for the bodily 4
injury remains extinct,but a new gr-vance of a distinct
nature,nainely,the deprivation suiffemd br tlie a ;rfe
childr, o12ih. :l o'iotiv ,, thi,  ' at- al -1j I, ad
i)]'I1 ", ' ,, 'J d ,i th- subject (f a ne'r
a~ise of -tinn in favor of those surviving relatives,
buu to be prosecuted in point of form by the executor or
administrator.
Comstock,J., dissented from this decision on the
ground that the statute was only required to create a
survivorship of the cause of action ex~isting at the com-
mon lawand maintained the double damage theory in the
view that whatever the deceased might have recovered in
his life time,would have become a part of the estate iand
thus have passed to the widow and the next of kin
I cannot see why the fact that they were indirectly
the gainers by the well deserved compensation which the
deceased had recovered in his life time should preclude
them from the fa± greater damage w .ich they had sustained
by reason of his death. In any event the reasonin g is
mere abstraction and not in the slightest degree based
upon elements of construction afforded by the statute.
Admitting,for the sake of argument,the plausibilty and
force of the suggestion,it's weakness is,I thinJexposed
by this following concrete illustration. Suppose "A"
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receives personal injuries 1o.,i "B" and six months there-
after dies leaving ftm survivingAa widiw and 6ne child.
His estate is insolvent. Before his death however he set-
tles the matter of his injury at the hands of "B" for $500
('500.00) and takes "B's" note there-for at seven months.
After his death the note passes to the administrator who
collectw it and pays the proceeds to his creditors. In cl
*the sligkt gain
such an event*which they might heve derived from the com-
pensa ion for the personal injury is made conditional upon
the solvency of the deceased's estabe.and in any event
o±
they are but the gainers in the sole respect of-, what he
has received for-his _fhysical sufferin,for the reason
that the compensation for medical expenses,nursing &c. as
also the loss to his business,merely fill up " ap made
in the estate by the personal imjury itself, and leave the
estate in the same financial position which it had before
the commis ion of the wrong.
The above illustration demonstrates conclusively
thatthat if recovery o" settlement for the -personal injury
is to bar the statutory action thenin the cases for which
it is really intended tosrovide,the statute itself will
sub vert it's own _urpose.
Following the case of WThitford vs. The Panama and
submitting _o the authority of the principles enunciatted
in that case,it was decided in ,Schlichting vs. Wintgen
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"that it was no defense to an action brought under the
statute that the deceased had in his life kime brought an
action and recovered and collected a judgment against the
same defendant ,for damage sustained by him by reason of
the same wrongful actV After q uoting Whitford vs.Panama
Dykman,J., continues:-
"There are facts for it's (the statutory
action's) maintainance now which had no exXistence a6 the
time of s ch judgment:now the husband is deadand although
the wrongful act of the defendant remains the s m, yet
that event has shown that other persons are effected by
it who were not before,-the wife and next of kin are de-
prived of protection and supportV The common law gave no
redress for such loss,becae legal liability departed vin
with the person receiving the wrong. All remedy was in-
terscinded by the decease,but this statute created an
action for surviving relatives for he pecuniary injuries
resulting to them from he death".
The last sentence prompts the remarjhat the evil
to the wife and kin has ever ex~istedtheve loss has ever
been a consequent of the wrongful act,which the law,by
the statute,for the first time offers cognizance and
suffers a redress.
We have now arrived,in chronological progress,to the
discussion of a case which presents the argument in op-
position to the theory which we have seen fit to favor,in
the strongest aspect of which iL is capablewith a clearn
ness and force, (and I may add an ingenious logic) which
ha- ever characterized the opinions of the learned judge
who is the author of the prevailing opinion.
To tlie trained intellect of Judge Rapallo it was
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clearly evident that the "rationes decendendi" advanced
in the case of Read vs. The Great Eastern,and the sub-
sequent decisions of the same import,were the sophis-
tries devised for the defence of a construction that was
purposed to defeat an effect which failed to accord with
certain judicial criteria of justice. These "rationes
decendendi may be classified as follows,-
(I)Y That the action
for which the statute provided was the mere survival or
continuation of the right of action that had or would
have vested in the deceased.
(II). That the ac-
tionable right under the statutewhile it's scope is en-
larged and it is based upon entirely new elements or
principles of damagederiving it's actionabilityas it
does,from the same wrongful act from which the primary
injury flowedit is for that reason dependent for it's
maintainance upon the status of the right created by
that primary injury.
(III). That to allow
a recovery~upon both the comnon law and statutory right
would be to suffer a dual compensation to be had for the
injuries that resulted from the same wrongful act. (to
restate the double damage theory).
His negative of the first and third propositions is
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embodied in the sentence'That the right of action given
by the Act of 1847(substantially Lord Campbell's Act)to
the personal representatives of one whose death has been
caused by the wrongful act,neglector default of another
is a new right of action created by the statute and is
not a continuation in the representatives of the right
of action which the deceased had in his life-time.'
The third proposition is rejected from consideration
in these summary 6rms,-wThe damages of the perty injured
are different and distinguishable from those which his
[ERY
nnext of kin sustained by his death and no DOUBLE RECOVR-
OF THE SAME DAMAGE WOULD RESULT.'
It is thus apparent that he has refused to resort
to the reasoning or the authority of fallacious prece-
dent in accomplishing a determination of the question in
controversy. Seeking an identical result he has choden
other means for the attainment of his end. The method
he has adopted has little to do with the relation of the
respective rights. His argument is confined to the in-
terpretation of certain of the enacting clauses in the
statute and upon these clausesor parts of clauseshe
has placed reliance for the maintainance of the propo-
sition,,which is incorporated in the following extract
from the opinion,and which presentsin substance,his ar-
gument in contravelion of the theory whih we incline to
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to favor;-.That it was the intention of the statute to
provide for the case of an injured party who had a good
cause of actionbut died from his injuries without hav-
ing recovered his damages-,and in such a case to withdraw
from the wrong-doer the immunity afforded by the connon
law rule that personal actionj die with the person/and
togive the statutory- ation as a substitut- or the
action which the deceased would have had while he lived!
The clauses upon which he has made dependent the esta
-blishment of this construction are these;-
N.B. See next page i.E, 42.
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"That the wrongdoer shall be liable to an action for dam-
ates notwithstanding the death of the person injured,and
a though the death shall have been caused under such cir-
cumstances as amount in.law to a felony."
(2). "Thut the act,neglect or default is such as would(if
death had not ensued) have entitled the injured party to
maintain an action and recover damages".
Of the first clause Judge Rapallo has this to say,-
"It does nou say that the wrong-doer shall have satisfied
the party injured,or notwithstanding that the latter has
recovered judgment against him,or notwithstanding any
other defense that he might have had at Lhe time of the
deathbut merely that the that the death of the party
shall not free him from liabilityshowing that this is Lhe
point at which the statute is aimed."
I think that the language will not warrant the attach-
ing of this further significancqand alternate meaning to
the clause in question,and that an anai.sis of the clause
will establish the soundness of my criticism. It's in-
tendment is explained by the nature of the function it I'
fulfills. This clause is incorporated in the statute for
the purpose of effecting the survival of that quality of
the wrong,in relation and subject to the environing factq
whic would,by virtue of the rule "Actio p ersonalis",
have been destroyed at the common lav.$ rhichif not des-
troyed,would have been futile for the reason of there
being no principle upon which the injuries flowing from
and based upon the deathcould have been redressed at law.
It was intended by this clause that death should be a
wrong to the next of kin or the widow,that wrongful homi-
cide should be a tort. It was intended by this clause
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To prese-ve the quality which gave the original injury
it'a actionability at law,sc that it might be the actio-
nable basis for the statutory wrong,which is death;tl i
that the actionability pertaining to the right which the
deceased had,shall survive to the statutory right for upon
the actionability of the deceased's right of action that
statutory action is made to depend. If the statute had
made the action it created dependknt upon the ex~istence
of a right of action in the deceased,or a right of actio
tha survived the deceasedthe statutory action could nt,
r2for the most part,be maintained.s If death had been in-
stantaneous no right could vest and the statutory action
would not accrue. If the primal right had vested and the
person injured had died before recovery there-upon,the
statutory action could not be maintained for the reason
of the maxim "Actio personalis". This very fact contro-
verts conclusively Judge Rapallo's proposition that the
d
Legislature intended that that the statutory action shou.
depenh pon the ex~istence,in the injured party ,of a
right to sue if he were still alive. If the statuteas
he contends,was directed to the obviation of that rule,
a
it would not make the right created, dependAnt upon a right
which must have been destroyed(according to his theory)
before the statutory action could have been maintained f=e!
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for it is not pretended that the statute effects the sur-
vival of the common law right.
I think,then, that it is clear that if the intention
of the statutory clause in discussion is accepted as being
intended to effect the survival of the quality of action-
ability derived from the original wrongthat is to obviate
the principles or defects in the system of the common lav
that would have accomplished it's deatruction,then it may
be said to effect perfectly it's purpose and that any
reference to- the stat's of one right,ex)isting bY virtue
of the wrong,would have been foreign to it's object,futl
and mere surplusage.
But he says:-
"It says notwithstanding deathand notwith-
standing merger,if it meant that the statutory actione =s
phouldnot be dependgnt upon thecondition of the deceased'
claim(7:otc,-that is to say upon the status of th right
of action for the personal injury primarily flowing rrom.
the wrong)why does it not say that the action may be
maintained notwithstanding satisfaction and 
judgment for
the deceased's right?"
For the reason that,as I have said,the clause 
deals
with the actionability of the personal injurywhich it seek
to preserve to the resulting death. Actionability 
is the
quality which creates the original or prima y 
right to
tsue. It has to do with the circumstances 
that make the
injury w"ongful. A satisfaction or judgment ha"e 
not the
slightest reference to the quality of 
the act which
created the right to su ut relate~strictly to the 
extin-
guishment of the right which the deceased hadby 
viriue
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of Lhe actionable wrong. The cla..se is not aimed at the
continuation of his action,why then, should it refei' to his
right and how would the extinction by satisfacuionor
judgment of the right, which arose by virtue of one injury
which flow , from the wrong, destroy the actionability which
the statute says shall survive to the action which it
creates. Th'fact that two rightssspring from the
same actionable source does not make ipso facto recovery
upon thbne dependnt upon the legal status of the other.
In short,how can tie maintainance of the statutory action
.,hich Judge Rapallo admits to be a creation,a new right
based uLyon a different principle,be madein the absence
of an express provision to that effect , to depend upon
the status of another and wholly different right. It I af
firm,cannot be reasonably so concluded. For in the absence
of an express provision the logic of the situation must
prevailwhich renders clear the soundnes- of 'he conclu-
sion tha the Legislature did not intend to effect the sit
uation of The respective claims;that this clause in review
was intended solely to provide that the actionability
$
which arose from the original wrong should Aurvive cer, -
tam obstacles nd render the death resulting 
from such
injury likewise actionable.
The confusion in the respect of this clause 
arises
from the factthat the statutory right of action 
is based
upo~n injury hat flows secondarily from the primal wrong,
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that the common law and statutory rights nave the same
actionable source. This created in the superficial co--
structionist the idea that the satisfaction of two injur -
ie; resulting from the sEamfe wrongful act is . d,,a pay-
ment for the damage it occas5iuns and tha there-fore such
a situation could not have been intended by the legisla-
ture. Nothing was ever more apparently absurd.
In conclusion,this clause was intended to fix the
test of the liability for the statutory wrong,which is
death.' It serves it's purpose adequately and complete-
ly. It provides against -and obviates the only principles
in the system of the common law which could have effected
the destruction of the actionable quality essential to the
statutory action. It is sufficient for itself and a ref-
-rence to rj~hts would have been surplusage.
Judge Rapallo referring to the second clause contin-
ues : -
"The condition upon which the statutory action depends
is declared to be that the actneglect or default is such
as wuuld(if death had not &nsued) have entitled the injui-d
party to maintain an action and recover damages. This
language was strictly accurate if the language was inte-
ded to apply to the case of a partywho,having a good L
cause of action for a personal injurywas prevented by the
death which resulted from such injury from pursuing his
remedie or who omitted in his life time to so do.
It pzecisely pits such a case but it is singularly inap-
propriate to on9who in his life time had maintained an,
action and actually recovered his damage".
It is pparentas Judge Rapallo admits in a latter
clause,that the condition that the wrongful act must be
such as would have entitled the injured party to maintain
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an action"i-efers to the circumstances of the injury and
the character of the act,including the question of con-
tributory negligence" but,he adds,"it does not follow
that it can have no further effect".
For the purpose of maintaining the construction ,iih
which he favo--s,he extends it's meaning from an express
reference to the uality of the wrong (iiich looks to a
resulting actionability) to a reference to the legal
status of the claimior the condition of the vested right
accruing to the injured party by reason of the injury
which he has sustained from the wrong done him. In ef-
fect,he changescolors and extends the clause to a further
meaning expres.ed accurately in this sentence:-That the
statutory liability shall depend upon the condition that
the wrongful act,neglect or default is one (not such)
which would have entitled the injured party to maintain
an action if he were alive.' That is to saysubstantially,
that if the injured party had extinguished his right of
action,a right of action which would vest and perish be-
fore the rigt of action created by the statute can exist,
then the statutory action shall be barred before it can
possibl~come into being. I think that this further effect
is not warranted by the language and that if it were war-
ranted it would be inharmonious with the body of the
statute.
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The clause makes the condition upon which the statutory
action shall depend,to belthat the"act neglect or default
is such',-
The clause is manifestly directed o the nature of
thW wrong from which tha actionable right of the party in"-
jured aiose. It cannot b rightfully be strained from
a reference to the nature of a wrong,to the condition of
a right which that wrong creates. If such had been the
purpose of the Legislature they would not have intrusted
their intendment to the doubtful expression that is said
to embody it;they would not have left so vital an element
to the uncertain interpretation of a varying judicial in-
tellect but would have,by an express provisionplaced the
intention beycnd judicial conjecture. If such had been
the effect they had intendedcould it not have been plain-
ly and accurately accomplishedby a clause which would
have made the statutory liability depend.nt,not upon the
nature, , h of the actneglect or defaultbut
upon the right of the injured party to have maintained an
action for the wrongful act &c. at the time of his death
or,in another form,if he were still alive. How simple and
adequate would such a provision have been to the construct
ion for which the learned Judge argues! How significant
is the omission, and can he in the consideration of the
various rights effected,substituteby int~pretation,a iv:
meaning totally diverse to the one so accurately expresS-
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-%ed in the language,when by a simple provision,the Legis-
lature could have expressed the intention,which as he
maintains,governs their enactment. TIthink that it is
manifest that the Legislature intended to confine the
clause to it's patent nature,strictly to the wrong from
which the statutory right is to derive it's actionability.
Continuing,the clause makes the statutory action dep-
endant upon the condition that the act,neglect or default
is such;-
The wordsuchdenmonstrates a reference to it's
*if
nature,not it's condition showirg that Athe condition and
not the quality had been in mind,the word used would have
been inapplicable.
Again,the act,neglect or default must been such
as would:- The word would Judge Rapallo relatesby his
t- rintrfe ationto4 the period of the death,to the abiltiy
of the injured partr to maintain an action as if he had I
lived.' I think that not to be the proper int'!pretation;
It means that the act &cc. must have been such as would,by
reason of it's nature,have entitled the injured party to
*time of the
maintain an action from the very happening of the injur;
that it does not mean that the statutory action shall cd
depend upon the continued ex~istence of the injured par-
ty's right of action from it's accrual to the period of i
his death. It refers to a singlevesting and not a con-
50.'tinuance until the right shall have been destroyed by
death or merger.
The act,neglect or default is such as would(if death
had not ensued).
To the wordss"(if death had not ensued)"the Judge at-
taches the eepest significance. He aff~ims that it shows
that the legislature had in mind the case of one whose de
death prevented him from enforcing his right and not the
case of one who had recovered his damages and tjied have
died. I think that it does not purport such .meaning.
or that the clause was torporated in ithat thQught.t.
This expression for it's fair analysis must be taken
in connection with the next two succeeding words "have
entitled". Taken together their meaning must be cons-
Fr
trued to be(if judge Rapallo's int~.pretation is to pr.-
vail) that when the wrongful act,neglect or default was
of such a nature that the deceased could not have recover
ed at the period of his death,then,and in every such casq
the personal representatives may maintain in action for .
/
the benefit of the widow and the next of kin. If such
were the true intent of the clausethat is to say if it
referred to the deceased's ex~isting right to sue at the
period of his death,then in evAry case where the death is
instantaneous there could be no recovery under the -t
statute, for there would have been no vested right in the
deceased upon which it could have been based. If the
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import of the statute is that the statutory action can
only be had where death or merger prevented the deceased
from being"entitled" to sue,then the action could only
be maintained where the death was,. instantaneouslfor the
reason that the survival of a rn~nute would have entitled
him for that minute to maintain his action and as he "w
"would have been entitled to suXe" the statute cannot op-
erate to give the action for the benefit of the widow and
the next of kin. It is apparent,I thinkthat if you adopt
the .udge's intrepretation as to any one wordto *btain
anything like sense you are compelled to eliminate or
change entirely the meaning of the others which perfect
the clause. Such a construction is untenable.
This last argument may of course be answered by the
substitution of the word "could" for "entitled" which,I
must admit,would be in strict accord with the judge's mode
of construction which is merely a confirmation of the
statute to his standard of justice and the judicial idea
* and
of what would have been the wise,,expediehimeasure. The
word "entitled" manifestly confines the scope of the -p
phrase to this,that the deceased must have at Qnim if
had lived long enough for the vesting of an action,been ei
entitled to maintain an action;that the iiature df the
wrong must have been such as would have given him a sub-
sisting right of action,;that the fact that the deceased
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was or would have been entitled to maintain an action ,i2
shall be the test of the right of the representatives to
sue under the statute'* Judge Rapallo to the contrary
maintains that it means that the wrongful act,neglector .
default must have been such that it prevented the injured
party from obtaining his redress at law before his death,
such being,as he thinks,the sole situation which the Leg-
islature had in mind. In my opinion to so interpret the
clause would be to unwarrantably alter .the expression vi
which so accurately and consistently embodies the condi-
tion~that as the statutory action is dependXnt upon
the actionable quality of the primary wrongsthat that
actionable quality shall survive the effect of those
principles which would have otherwiseextinguished it and
shall be the basis of the created right.
In a subsequent paragraph of his opinion Judge Rapal-
lo says:-
"That the language of the act plainly indicates,I
kacL
think, that the framers Ain mind the common law rule
"Actio personalis",and that their main purpose was to
deprive the wrongdoer of the inmunity afforded by that
rule".
If I may differ with the learned 'Tudge,I,can see
nothing in the general scope of this enactment from it's
first to it's last word,which indicates expresslyor in-
deed inferentially,the intention of effecting the abr(ga-
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tion of that rule. The very nature of the "rationes de-
cendendi" in the case at hand demonstrate most thoroughly
that if there is in the enactment any such latent inten-
tion-,that it is only to be derived from such materials as
an inference(which borders on creation),an alternate and
presumed significance of words and phrases bearing upon
their face a plain and consistent meaning. The title de-
e
elares it to be"an act for the compensating of the familie
of persons killed in accidents";the preamble recites the
evil to be remedied by the act to be "that no action at
law now expists for a wrongful death;the enacting part of
the statute creates the right to such an action and the
subsequent section confines the ieusir inent of d ,aj ,un-
der the new right,to the damages resulting from the death.
A proposition could not be more completely refuted if we
are to be guided by thie express provisions of the statute.
If indeed it were the true purpose and intent of the act
to deprive the wrongdoer of the immunity from liability
afforded by the common law rulethen the Legislature must
be deemed to have adopted a widely circuitous m0ans for
the attainment of their endand to have intrusted their
real intention to the thicK shade of inference and ambig-
uity which is said to surround it.
7n the concluding paragra h of t'e rpiio t'-e
Judge continues :-
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"If the act had squarely declared that the action might
be maintained notwithatar4ng recovery and Aaccord and
sat sfavtion with the deceased in his life time,the leg-
islature might well have paused before enacting it to con-
sider the policy of such a provision".
TL Judge . castigates the intellect and
far seeing prudence of when he presumes t1 t t
that theyr were not as fully aware as heof the state of
the common law and the effect of their legislation there-
uponnd that they did not know the relation and effect of
their enactment to that status. The "assembled wisdom of
Sitx)4" or his own rTew York,must have known that an action
exXisted at the common law for a personal injurythat men
sometimes die slowly~and that it was not improbable that
a person,between the happening of the injury and the p,. rid
period of his deathmight bring an action for the personal
injury to him and the damage accrued thereupon and recover
there-for,or enter into an accord and satisfaction for the
same,and that after such satisfaction or recovery the in-
jury might result in death.
Such a contingency would have
been patent to the least intelligencand the fact that th,
they did not declare that a recovery or satisfaction in
the lifetime of the deceased should be a bar to the act-
ion under the statuteconclusively warrants the inference
that they intended that it should not so operate,
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If their desire was to _j-.e.ly aoji -_the . ffect of
the maxim "Actio personalis" why then did they not adopt
the simple measure that would most naturally suggest it-
self,a survival statute. Why does not that purpose
appear somewhere in the act expressly9  Why is there inten
-tion left to inference and presumption? If the intention
was that the action created should be a substitue for the
commonlaw right of action ,would it not have been natural,
in view of the great diversity in the nature of the rights,
that they somewhere express so vital an element of their
tY-intention? sincethey have not is it not a highly arbitrar
rule
,and an unwarranted onethat effects a bar?
aontinaiing the foregoing-.' sentence ,he concludes:-
"The legislature might well have paused to consider
the policy of such a provision and how prejudicially it
would opei.ate against the interests of the party injured
by depriving him of the power of settling his claim or of
realizing anything from it in his lifetime. It would nat-
urrlly, if not inevitably prevent such settlements and pro.
crastinate litigation until it could be determined whether
death would ensuefrom the injury."
I cannot see,in a broad sense,how it would operate
prejudicially upon the interests of the party injured in
depri ving him of the power of settlig his cl;mm or re-
alizing anything upon it in his lifetime. The ex~istence
of his right of action is as well established by the auth-
ority of the cormnon law as the action which vests in the
personal representatives by thf- enactment of the Legis-
lature. They are absolutely independint one of the other.
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A settlement or recovery for his injuriesjy the de-
ceased in his life-time,would bar the right of action
which was his. The primal right would bein such a case,
that is by the agreement of the parties or the operation
of lawabsolutely extinguished and the right of action th
thereby accruing be barred If' there were no such agree-
ment or recovery the death itself,per the common law rule,
would prevent recovery. Of course it would be the nat-
ural policy of the wrongdoer to refuse settlement for the
right of action based upon the personal injuries in the
h ope that the fatal result of his own wrong would extif
-guish the right of action before recovery could be had,
and it would in that degree procrastinate litigation
While the refusal of the wrongdoer would render an action,
in a sense imperative,and in that procrastinate litigatio;.
the evil occas~ioned by such procrastination is insignif-
icant when we view it in comparison with the result oc-
cas~ioned by the constructiohich would compelX the in-
jured partyif he were to care at all for the interests
of a dependjant family and wished to gemrd those interests,
to foresee his own death and by such a foresight
refuse the acceptance of a pittance which would if accept-
ed~bar the right of the representative from recovering the
far greater damage under the statuteiand to' the very money
which he might accept in satisfaction of his injury would
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notif his estate were insolventbenefit in the least deg-
ree his family,for the reason that it would. be subjected
to the payment of his debts
We have now completed the discussion of th8 substi-
tute theory" which is given it's most forcible presenta-
tionby Judge Rapallo,in the case revic;'ed,and which comes
nearer,th.n any other propounded,to a forcible argument
contrary to the view which seems the best to us. Tt is
not arrived at by a logical progression,by a comparative
study of the relation of the statute to antecedent la, ,
but is evolved from the unsubstantial basis of inference,
alternate and dual meaningand a creation and acceptance
of a secondary meaning in a case where inference is tol-
erable,such secondary meaning being inconsistent with the
goneral frame of the act.
the
Succeeding the case of Littlewood vs. Mayor in
June,I885,it wau Said.,upon a collateral questionin Hed-
erich vs Keddic,-
"T hat the wrong defined by the statuteindicates
no injury to the estate of the person killed,and cannot
either logically or legally be said to effect any property
rights of such person unless it can be maintained that
a -person hao a property right in his own ex'istence. The
property right created by the statute is one ex(isting in
favor of the beneficiaries of the recovery only1 and dep-
ends for it's exXistence upon the death of the party inju-
redoIt has no previous life and can0 be said to have been
injured by the very act which creates it .
Again it is said contra to littlewood vs. The "ayor, s
supra,
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"That the description of the actionable clause s,ems to
be inserted merely to characterize the nature of the act
which is intended by the statute to be made actionable,and
to define the kind and degree of delinqutncy with which
the defendant must be chargeable in order to subject him
to the action,or,as said in the Whitford case,"the act,
neglect or default must be uich as would,if death had not
ensued,have entitled the injured party to maintain an a
action. The significance of the words"if death had not
ensued7 is apparent. Had the description ended with the
words"who would have been liable to the decedent" it might
have been contended with force that the statute did not
apply where death ,,,as instantanoies,f( - in such a case it
might have been said that the deced _nt had no sause of
action in his life-time. The words"if death had not en-
uerd" indicate that the test is not th ecedent's actual
opportunity for bringing suit, but whether the wrongful
action and his relation to suchas if he hed lived,would
have given him a right of action".
In the case of ,urphy vs, ".Y. Central & H.R.R.R.
1'o. it was held,-
"That the right of action given by the statute
to the representatives of one whose death had been caused
by the wrongful act,neglect or default of anotheris a new
right of action created by the statuteand is not the mere
continuation by the personal ripresentatives of the right
of action which the deceased had in his life-time".
In 7'urral, vs.Usher,an action for the wrongful death,
evidence was offered by the defendants that they had paid
the expenses of the support and maintainance of the person
injured up to his death:and for his burial. Upon this
pointthe Court in the opinion deliveredsaid:-
"That the proof
was not offered with a view of showing that the cause of
action in favor of the decedent had been satisfieor dis-
charged)and no such defense was set up in the answer".
This ruling of the court followed the logical premise t
ablished in the case of Littlewood vs- The ?'ayorsupra,
which the court accepted as determining
"That the action given
to the next of kin by the statute while not a continaation
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of the same right of action which vested in the intestate,
was ,evertheless,made dependint upon the ex~istence of
a cause of action in the decedent at the time of his deat
not satisfied or otherwise discharged,for the recovery of
damages for the same negligence".
In following,as I have said,this premise,The court
has involved itself in a glaring and almost ridiculous in-
consistency. The satisfaction of the very elements of
damIge upon which the doceased's right of action would-*
have been basedare offered in evidence in mitigation of
the damage sought to be recovered under the statuteand,
as being of that naturqand inasmuch as they are offered
for such a purpose,they are excluded from consideration,v
the Pourt, saying, that if these elements of damag4had been
offerednot in the intrinsic form of acts or payments,as
the MITIGATION OF THE RIGHT TO RECOVERBUT IN THE FORM OF
THE EFFECT OF THE ACTS OR PAYMENTS,NAMELYOF A SATISFACT-
IO4 OR DISCITARGE,THAT IS TO SAY,IF THE LEGAL FORM HAD BEEN
PRESENTED, RATHER THAN THE REAL SUBSTANCE OF WHICH IT
WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPRISED,then and in every such case,
these elements of daige,or rather their satisfaction,might
be properly admitted. This suprisin' reverence for
legal forrwas inevitable if they were to submit to the
"rationes decendendi" presented in the case of Littlewood
vs. The Mayor. It reveals the very falsity of the situ-
ation by the shifts to which it is reduced in the submis-
sion to the authority.
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The latest case decided in kew York,pertinent to this
thests,is that of Wooden vs. The N.Y. & Penn. R.R. Co.
It repeats substantially the propositions which we have
previcusly exposed.
Before resigning the discussion of the cases in
point I am constrained to saythat in a case which was
argued in the Moot Court of this University,and which
embodied the precisely the situation which we discuss,
an opinion was delivered which I may say(disregarding the
suspicion which such a statnent may create)more clearly
developed the status in jurisprudence of the rights con-
sidered,more logically deduced conclusions from their
relation,:and naturqand more squarely conformed to the
established and fdndamental rules of construction and in-
terpretation~than any opinion upon the point in issue
which has been rendered in any court since the question
was first mooted. It covers completely and succinctly the
arguments "pro and con" and arrives at a judgment of i-,,,aso
Reason ,unhampered and unimpeded by judicial sophistry,
error or particular criteria of justice.
RECAPI T ULATION.
I have treated,certainly with length,and I think with
thouroughnes evy case materially in point which has been
adjudicated within the jurisdictions of England and the
State of New York,cases which present every adverse and
affirming argument.
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My annotations or criticisms I have intended and belli
have ,to a grea6 degree exposed the "rationes decendendi",
and if they have not demonstrated their fallacy have at
least manifested their strengthas resistance will. I Pve
di;e c t d
thereforein conclusion,to a recapitulatory consideration
of the rights whose nature and relation we seek to know
Le_
as a means of determining the intendment of the act and th
solution of the problem which is the subjecL of this the-
sis.,to which shall at once proceed.
Extisting in the system of the common law were two
defects or evils,tlie one positive,the other negative,. Ta
The first consisted in an established ,operating rule •
The second,in the lack of a principle_1which lack precip-
itated evil upon the interests add rights of individuals.
The first was the rule"Actio personalis moritur cum per-
sona". The second the established doctrine of the common
law that the death of a human being could not be complain -
ed of as a civil wrong.
A statute bearing the name of "Lord Pampbell's" ACt
was enacted by the parliament of Great Britian to remedy
one of these ex~istenlt evils. Itl title expressly states
that it is directed to the creation of an action fo- the
compensating of families of persons killed in accidents.
It's preamble recites that the evil which it is intended
to cure \the lack of a 1 rincipla in the system of the corn-
6.
mon law which would have enforced the right whose rec-
ognition they deemed essential to the welfare of soc-
iety. This purpose is manifest in the phrase "where-as
no action at law is now maintainable against a person
who by his wrongful act ,neglect or defaultmay have
caused the death of another person".
The enacting clause of the statute consistentlyac-
curatel and adequately provides for the incorporation
of the desired right in the system of jurisprudence. It
states plainly the nature of the actionthe test of the
right to maintain which~they established as the wrongful
quality of the injury which caused his death;and lest
this actionable qualityby the operation of certain rules
or principles of law,should perishthey expressly obviate
e
their effect by saying that the action shall be maintaind
not-with-standing the dequth of the person injured and
although the death shall have been eaused under such cir-
cumstances as amount in law to a felony'.
It's nature,the very provisions of the act ,refue con-
clusively the proposition that the act was intended to
obviate the rule"actio personalis'for at no place in
it's context does there appear the slightest reference tO
the rule,but the very reverse. The enacting method taken
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for the remedy is strangelyridiculously inapplicable to
the rule or it's obviation. A new interest is guarded
and new persons are created its beneficias,.upon
whom that rule could have had no effect;and the very el-
ements of damage for which a cure of the rule should have
provided a recovery not-with-standing death ,are disre-
garded utterly_,and new elements designated and substitu-
ted.That ,there-forethe intention of the Act as gathered
from it's structure,inherent naturefair effect and ex-
ed
press purposeis not the abrogation of the maxim "Actio
personalis moritur cum persoma* is demonstratedland it is
established contra that the principle to be affected was
the one which provided that the wrongful destruction of
a human life should not be recognized as a civil wrong.
Accepting these last conclusions as our premises we
will develop the various theories of itVs nature and pur-
pose here-to-fore propounded.
(I). It has been said that it
is a continuation of the deceased's right of action.
This proposition needs no refutation in reason or
authority. It arose and was plausible in the fact that
the thing continued was the actionable quality of the r :
wrong and not the primary right which sprang from it.
(II). The second theory advanced
was that it was a continuation of the deceased's right
of action with it's scope enlarged to include the damage
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resulting from the death".
This theory was as erronious as the other for the
reason that it was based on a refuted continuance. It
is slightly more plausible in that it accounts for the
new and different damage awarded. It's error is based
like-wise upon the survival or continuance of the action
able quality of the wrong.
(III). The last theory of the
Act ,which is propounded in the case of *Littlewood vs.
the Mayor",is the one which affirms the statutory action
to have been intended by the legislatureas a substitute
for the right of action which the deceased hadand for
whichby vritue of his omission or inabilityhe had
neither effected a settlement or obtained a recovery.
7
,he first two theories are admitted fallacious and
are denied by the author of the third. He perceived that
the very act itself and it's intended effect furnished th
the means of their complete refutation.
In the pursuance of some idea of which he was pos- A
sesse+r in the desire to satisfy Authority by submis-
sion to the judicial idea of justice or WHAT SHOULD HAVE
U
BEEN DONE,he developed a most ingenis theory and one 4
that from it's very nature defies a conclusive refuta-
tion. T ike the infallible arguments of Henry George
they present a fallacious front but,for the life of you,
you cant get at their roots,-for the very good reason,in
64.
the case in hand,that they are beyond the Act itself, w4-
which is ordinarily the basis for constructionand lie
far out in intangible realms of justice,of mental inten-
tion,of things that should have been. Ais processes of
argument are inferencealternate meaning and ideas as to
a certain policy they would have pursuedlif they had per-
ceived a certain evil that has since arisen.
Though the statute is adverse in it's provisions,thw
though it looks directly to the cure of another evil and
states clearly the purpose,though in truth it proceeds
to cure in the enactment the evil sought to be remedied,
the wTheory" interposes and says,'That it is all very
well,but that they did not mean what they said,that they
had in mind a very different evil,and that this different
evil,not-with-standing the inapplicable method of cure,wa
was the evil they intended to remedy. It in effect main-
tainsthat when the statute provided that the quality and
the conditions which render the primary injuries flowing
from the wrong actionable ,should be the test of the
right to maintain the action under the statute,-they in
reality meant more and differently than they said for the
reason that their purpose was to make the right to sue
under the statute depend~nt upon the status in law of the
deceased's right to sue for the primary injurt.
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Turning from the theory itself,we will for a time
consider the logic of it's effect. A person receives an
injury from a wrong done him by another. It costs him
pain and suffering,medical or surgical expensesloss of
business and such other damage as might naturally have I
flowed from the circumstances of the injury. The wrong-
doer perceiving his liability enters into an accord and
satisfaction with the person injured,e compensates him
for the apparent damage occas~toned him and the injured
party,not knowing that he is about to die(as the case may
be),accepts that recompense for the damage he has re-
ceived in satisfaction of his rightand by that fact bars
a different right,which vests in different personsbasedt
upon different and distinct elements of damage and which*
in truthIS NOT AND CANNOT BE IN EXAISTENCE AT THE TIME
OF IT'S LEGAL DESTRUCTION. There appears a slight fal-
lacy in the reasoning. How ca# persom release that over
which he has no control.and in which he has neither right
or interest.
Suppose the injured party to have received a latent
hurtwhich to the eye is slight and which threatens no d&
danger of life andrelying upon the appearance,he enters
into an accord and satisfaction with the wrongdoer upon
the basis of the injury which he beleives he has received
"Ipso facto" the right of action which would have arisen
at his deathfrom the injuries fatal resultis extinguisk-
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-ed.Is that a rational effect which rests the utility
of the statute and the right which it creates upon the
e
judgment of a single,injured and disintersted manwhich a
makes the right to recover for the great wrong of his dek
death depend'bnt upon his ability to foresee it. The
effect seems as absurd as the intention applied to the I
language.
The cause of the conflicting interpretations of the
statute,the origin and plausible bases of the various
theories developed to satisfy individual ideas of justiceg
consist in the fact that the injury to the deceasedand
the death or injury to his family and kin-both originate
and derive their actionability from the same wrongful act.
It is therefore said that compensation for the two inju-
ries which flow therefrom is a dual satisfaction for the
same wrong. A man fires and hits one man and the ball
passes through and strikes another. The first Mcovers
for the injury he has received. Should that recovery
bar the right of action of the second. The injuries flow
from the same wrongful act. You respond that the person
secondarily injured does not claim damage through the
injury arising from the first effect.ie§,the injury to
the man first shot. You are assuredly right. Neither ca
could the injured party or his representatives maintain
an action for the death after recovery for the primary
wrong.
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Againwhile it is true that the widow and the next of
kin.recover for an p flows from a wrong that work-
ed a primary injury to the deceasedyet they recover by
the express authority of the statute which affords their
right to redress.
A second cause of the conflicting interpretationsl,
consists iMthe use of the words and sentences which op-
erate to effect a survival of the actionable qualityof
the wrongful act,with reference to the surrounding cir-
cumstances. "If death had not ensued',-Notwithstanding
death' .and "Although death shall have been caused under
such circumstances as amount in law to felony',are the
clauses that have affordedin interpretationcolor for
the argumentthat the legislature referred to the con-
dition of the right and not the nature of the wrong.It
is said that they might have meant the one,viz.,the :v.&
actionable quality~as a test for the statutory action,
and likewise have included the other and different mean-
ing, which would have so qualified the right as to have
made it in a great measure inoperative. If the act had
squarely said as they contend it to have been the inten-
tion of the legislature,that the statutory action could
only be maintained when the dece dent could have recov-
ered for his right at the period of his death"In the
absence of such an expressionany rule gathered from the
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slight and dubious material for inference incorporated
in the statutewould be of a highly arbitrary nature and
must rest upon the fiat of the court,which is a species
of legislation.
Another element of the argument which I am constrain
-ed to notein relation to the theory of substitution,
is the faet that the act itself is creative,a creation
pure and simple. If the legislature had in mind the in-
tention of substitution or dependgncy forlor upon the
common law rightthe action would not have been the
clearly independent creation that it is,-or accepting
the inperpretation of the clause questioned,they would
not have left their intention to substitute or render
depend.Xnt-,to mere inference but would have clothed it
in explicit and express language.
The opinions of the various judges who favor the
construction which appears to us to be the wrong one,deg-
-elopas we have shown,different and more or less falla-
cious means of attaining the desired end. The very
fact of their divergency is evidence that they were
written from the standpoint of the judicial idea of jus-
b ;&
ticeand that they were attemted to be suktained by a
judicial logic,varying in ingenuity and force. With a
discussion of this inherent justice we will conclude a
lengthy thesis.
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Aperson upon whomn a personal injury is inflicted re-
ceives,to a greater or less degreeor rather suffers,
physical pain and whatever of an estate he may possess
is subjected to the payment of the expenses that are-a
necessarily incurred in the treatment of the hurt re-
ceived. For this he may effect a settlement or obtain
a satisfaction. His death results. A dependgnt fam-
ily is suddenly deprived of the means of subsistence and
support and not,infrequently,face the direst want. More
valuable interests are affected,-ties are sundered which
result in i4juries that lie beyond the domain of pecun-
iary estimation. Is it just that the compensation rec-
eived for the personal injurywhich resultswith the ex-
ception of the part awarded for physical sufferingin
actual pecuniary lossshould bar the damage for the
greater and inestimable Wrong,Deathfor which a money
judgment is a paltrymocking satisfaction.
Are we to leanin our clemency,toward the wrongdoer,
the devastator,or toward the wrongedthe devastated? If
there is no injustice in compelling one who does a wrong
to anotherto satisfthat other for the damage he has
sustained thenassuredly,there is no injustice in compel
e
ling a person to pay for the eonsquence of the injury he
has inflicted even though from their gravefearful natur
they can never be compensated forby the mehs or methods
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of man. A
Allying natural and inherent justice to the determin-
ing command of the political sovereig4hat a death res-
ultir4 from a wrongful act,neglect or default,should be
compensated for within a determined limitshall we make
the effect of it's mandate.depend upon the frail and un-
certaim structure of human judgment or the condition of
a diverse right.
-- THE END.r.
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